Assad on Wahabbiism

They're taking our children: West Papua's youth are being removed to Islamic religious schools in Java for "re-education", writes Michael Bachelard

http://www.smh.com.au/lifestyle/theyre-taking-our-children-20130503-2inhf.html

Michael Bachelard

Captive audience … Papuan boys at the Daarur Rasul Islamic boarding school, outside Jakarta, behind locked gates. Photo: Michael Bachelard

Johanes Lokobal sits on the grass that cushions the wooden floor of his little, one-room house. He warms his hands at a fire set in the centre. From time to time a pig, out of sight in an annex, squeals and slams itself thunderously against the adjoining wall.

The village of Megapura in the central highlands of Indonesia's far-eastern province of West Papua is so remote that supplies arrive by air or by foot only. Johanes Lokobal has lived here all his life. He does not know his exact age: "Just old," he croaks. He's also poor. "I help in the fields. I earn about 20,000 rupiah [$2] per day. I clean the school garden." But in a hard life, one hardship particularly offends him. In 2005, his only son, Yope, was taken to faraway Jakarta. Lokobal did not want Yope to go. The boy was perhaps 14, but big and strong, a good worker. The men responsible took him anyway. A few years later, Yope died. Nobody can tell Lokobal how, nor exactly when, and he has no idea where his son is buried. All he knows, fiercely, is that this was not supposed to happen.

"If he was still alive, he would be the one to look after the family," Lokobal says. "He would go to the forest to collect the firewood for the family. So I am sad."

Heavy learning … boys and girls at Daarur Rasul. Photo: Michael Bachelard

The men who took Yope were part of an organised traffic in West Papuan youth. A six-month Good Weekend investigation has confirmed that children, possibly in their thousands, have been enticed away over the past decade or more with the promise of a free education. In a province where the schools are poor and the families poorer still, no-cost schooling can be an irresistible offer.

But for some of these children, who may be as young as five, it's only when they arrive that they find out they have been recruited by "pesantren", Islamic boarding schools, where time to study maths, science or language is dwarfed by the hours spent in the mosque. There, in the words of one pesantren leader, "They learn to honour God, which is the main thing." These schools have one aim: to send their graduates back to Christian-majority Papua to spread their muscular form of Islam.

Ask the 100 Papuan boys and girls at the Daarur Rasul school outside Jakarta what they want to be when they grow up and they shout, "Ustad! Ustad! [religious teacher]."

Watch and learn … students watch a performance of singing, dancing and wrestling. Photo: Michael Bachelard

In Papua, particularly in the Highlands, the issues of religious and cultural identity are red-hot. Census data from over the past four decades shows that the indigenous population is now matched in number by recent migrants, largely Muslims, from other parts of Indonesia. The newcomers' domination of the economy, particularly in the western half of the province, effectively marginalises the original inhabitants. This immigration means that indigenous Papuans have a real - and realistic - fear of becoming an ethnic and religious minority in their own country. Stories of people taking away their children adds an emotive edge and has the potential to inflame tensions in an already volatile region.

For about 50 years, a separatist insurgency has been active in Papua and hundreds of thousands have died in their efforts to gain independence for the province. Christianity, brought by Dutch and German missionaries, is both the faith of a vast majority of the indigenous population, and a key part of their identity. Islam actually has an even longer history in Papua than Christianity, but it's of a gentler kind than what's preached in Java's increasingly hardline mosques and it's still, for the moment at least, the minority religion. But when the pesantren children return from Java, their faith has changed. "They become different persons," Papuan Christian leader Benny Giay, tells me. "They have been brainwashed".

The schools insist they recruit only students who are already Muslims, but it's clear they are not too fussy. At Daarur Rasul, I quickly found two little boys, Filipus and Aldi, who were mualaf - brand new converts from Christianity. One radical Islamic organisation, Al Fatih Kafah Nusantara (AFKN), makes no bones about its intention to convert, and to use religion for political ends. Leader Fadzlan Garamatan says AFKN has brought 2200 children out of Papua as part of his program of nationalistic "Islamicisation". "When [Papuans] convert to Islam, their desire to be independent reduces," says Fadzlan on AFKN's internet page.

Lokobal says his son died after being taken to an Islamic school. Photo: Michael Bachelard

In restive West Papua, the movement and conversion of young children is politically explosive. We were warned a number of times not to chase the story. It's never reported in the Indonesian press. The chief of the Indonesia government's Jakarta-based Unit for the Acceleration of Development in Papua and West Papua, Bambang Darmono, downplays it as just one of "many issues in Papua", and the Religious Affairs Ministry's director of pesantrens, Saefudin, says he has never heard of it. But my efforts to trace the life and death of one Papuan boy has revealed that the trade goes on. And, in the service of grand religious and political aims, sometimes young lives are broken.

Elias Lokobal smiles to himself when he talks about the feisty little stepbrother he lost, but when talk turns to Amir Lani, his expression darkens. Lani is a local cleric in Megapura and the other villages surrounding the highland capital, Wamena. It was in about 2005 when he and Aloysius Kowenip, the police chief from the nearby town of Yahukimo, began approaching families to recruit their children. The pair worked to take five boys from vulnerable families in each of five villages and transport them to Java for education. Kowenip, a Christian, says it was his idea to "help" the children, and that the funding came from "the local government and an Islamic organisation" whose name he could not remember. He says he sought out children with only one living parent because "nobody guided them".

Young Yope was one such boy. Although he had a stepmother, his natural mother had died. His family was Muslim, though Yope sometimes went to a Christian church with his uncle. Neither Lani nor Kowenip ever visited Yope's father, Johanes Lokobal, to explain their scheme. It still rankles. "These people should ask permission from the parents," Lokobal says. Instead, they asked young Yope himself, who was enthusiastic about this adventure. Some friends had gone the previous year and he was keen to join them.

School spirit … students at Daarur Rasul perform chants in praise of prophet Muhammed. Photo: Michael Bachelard

When it came time for Yope to depart, it happened in a flash, stepbrother Elias recalls. "I went to school, and when I came back there was no one home."

Andreas Asso was part of the same group. Now a shy young man scrabbling a living in Jayapura, the capital of West Papua, he was perhaps 15 at the time. Like Yope, Andreas had only one parent. His father was dead and, though his mother was alive, he was living with his stepmother. Like Yope, he was approached directly. "They asked if I wanted to pursue my study in Jakarta for free," Andreas says. "The police chief never spoke to my stepmum but he spoke to my uncle, the brother of my father, and he agreed. I was born Christian and I'll always be Christian. The police chief just said we'd be put in a boarding house ... If he had told us it would be a pesantren, none of us would have wanted to go."

When the day came to leave, Andreas says a group of 19 boys were loaded into an Indonesian air force Hercules C-130 aircraft in Wamena. By some accounts, the youngest of them was just five. The plane was crewed by men in uniform. It has been difficult to verify whether the military was officially involved, but a former Papuan army chief says civilians are permitted to buy cheap tickets to fly on military aircraft as part of the military's "corporate social responsibility". "We didn't speak to the soldiers," Andreas recalls. "We were afraid."

It took two days for the plane to reach Jakarta and, "we were not fed or offered drinks. A few, especially the little ones, got sick ... a few vomited," Andreas says. "When they came to my village, I thought I wanted to go. But when I was in the aeroplane, all I was thinking was, 'I want to go back to my village.' " When they landed in Jakarta, the boys were driven about three hours to their new home - the Jamiyyah Al-Wafa Al-Islamiyah pesantren, high on the slopes of the volcano, Mount Salak, behind the regional city of Bogor. The head of the Al-Wafa school's foundation, Harun Al Rasyid, remembers Andreas Asso and the boys from Wamena, and the men who brought them, Amir Lani and Aloysius Kowenip, whom he knows as "Aloy". The two men had come and "offered the students" in 2005, he recalls. "Aloy was ambitious in politics, and bringing children to my pesantren was a way to improve his standing or image in society," Al Rasyid says.

Andreas Asso's account and his differ on many points but they concur on one: the boys from the village in the wild highlands of Papua simply did not fit in. "It wasn't like a real school because in school they have classes," Andreas says. "In this one, we just went to a big mosque and all we learnt about was Islam, just reading the Koran. Sometimes they slapped us on the face, beat us with a wooden stick. They just told us we Papuans were black, we have dark skin."

The food and education at Al-Wafa were free but the religion was strict. It has Yemeni teachers and Saudi funding and its website describes it as Salafi sholeh, or "pious Salafi". Its purpose: "Setting up a cadre of preachers and people who can call others to Islam." Andreas insists that, like him, some of the other boys were Christians, and that the head of the school changed five of their names to make them sound more Islamic - allegations Al Rasyid denies. For his part, Al Rasyid says the Papuans were an unruly rabble who exhausted the teachers "because their cultural background was different".

He says the boys urinated and defecated on the school grounds and stole the crops of neighbouring farmers. He admits punishing them by "scolding" and hitting them "with rattan on the foot". About two or three months after they arrived, one sickly boy, Nison Asso, died.

"He was 10 years old," says Andreas. "He was already sick in Wamena but ... he passed away. The body is still there in Bogor because the boarding school didn't have the money to send the body back, though his parents wanted the body sent back." Al Rasyid will not comment on Nison's fate. After less than a year, it was clear to both the boys and the school that the experiment was failing, so Amir Lani was summoned. Andreas says he pleaded with Lani to take him home, but was refused. Instead, Lani took them to Jakarta to another Papuan man, Ismail Asso, who himself had been an imported student whose name was changed. Ismail told the boys there was not enough money to return them to Papua. Their parents, it seems, were never consulted.

Some of the students were found a new pesantren in Tangerang, near Jakarta. Later they were to be expelled from there, too, because, according to Ismail Asso, "These children were already bad children in Papua." But Andreas stayed out of school and instead teamed up with another boy, Muslim Lokobal, "who was also a Christian but was given the name 'Muslim' ". The pair went to make their own way in the big city.

A persistent problem in researching this story has been pinning down details - names, times and ages. Names have been changed, roots erased, and village children rarely know their own age. The tragic end to Yope Lokobal's story suggests, however, that he may be the same boy whom Andreas Asso knew as Muslim Lokobal.

Andreas says that one night Muslim got drunk. There is no eyewitness to what happened next, and it's the subject of five or more differing, second-hand accounts. Andreas's is the most gruesome. "On the way back to the boarding house, Muslim made trouble with the local people, so they beat him up and killed him. They put his body inside the boarding house. And because they hated him, they took out one of his eyes and put a bottle in the eye socket." Does this awful scene describe Yope's death? Or was Muslim a different boy?

Back in the village of Megapura, they can shed little light. "There was a call from Jakarta to the mosque at Megapura, and the people from the mosque gave us the news," Johanes Lokobal recalls. "There was no explanation about how Yope died." Says stepbrother Elias: "It was 2009 or 2010. We just held a mourning ceremony at home, praying." Nobody knows where Yope's body is buried.

The rest of the boys from that Hercules would be in their early 20s by now. Last time Andreas Asso heard from them, they were in Jakarta as little better than beggars - "street singers or working in public transport - the drivers' assistant, collecting the passengers," he says. It's not known how many groups of children Amir Lani and Aloysius Kowenip organised to take away. Teronce Sorasi, a mother from Wamena, says she was approached in 2007 or 2008 by "the police chief", who asked her to send her daughter, Yanti, who was then five, and her son, Yance 11, to Jakarta, even though "we are a Christian family". "I said, 'no' because my husband had just passed away and we were still mourning," Sorasi says.

Amir Lani still lives in a villa in the hills near Megapura. According to Elias, whenever people ask him about the lost boys of Wamena, "he just avoids them". When I reach Aloysius Kowenip by telephone, he boasts of his scheme. "If any one of them has become somebody, then, as a Papuan, I am proud of that." But when asked about those who died or failed, Kowenip abruptly ends the call. A few days later, his friend Ismail Asso phones in a fury, then issues two threats via SMS. "I remind you ... not to dig out information about the Muslims of Wamena," he writes, otherwise the "provocative foreign journalist" will be "deported from Indonesia", or "axed, killed by the [people of] Wamena".

Internal transportation of children has a long and dishonourable history in Indonesia. Around 4500 children were removed from East Timor over the 24-year Indonesian occupation to serve, in the words of author Helene Van Klinken in her book Making Them Indonesians, a "proselytising Islamic faith", and to bind the region closer to Jakarta. Children, she wrote, were chosen because they were "impressionable and easily manipulated to serve political, racial, ideological and religious aims".

Papua has been a target in the past, too. In 1969, former president Suharto proposed transferring 200,000 children of the "backward and primitive Papuans, still living in the stone age" to Java for education. Another Saudi-backed group, DDII, used to bring children from both East Timor and Papua. And today, AFKN, which is linked to the thuggish, hardline Islamic Defenders Front (FPI), is actively seeking children to recruit.

Daarur Rasul is half pesantren, half building site in a satellite city of Jakarta called Cibinong. Here, 100 boys from the lowlands in Papua's western half crowd up to the heavy bars of a gate to greet us. The gate is locked because, according to one member of staff, "they like to escape". Forty or so girls live downstairs with more freedom of movement. School principal Ahmad Baihaqi insists he teaches moderate Islam, and the children are at least seven, but some look younger. He doesn't deny they are locked up, but says it is only during study hours "to put discipline on them".

In 2011, four boys did escape and claimed not only that they'd been forced to work on the construction site, but that at the school, they had been left hungry, given unboiled water to drink and were taught only Islam, Indonesian language and maths. Baihaqi insists the boys exaggerate, saying they had been "naughty" from before they arrived. He agrees that sometimes his students do work on the construction site, but says they enjoy it. The boys' lessons begin at 4am with prayers. School continues, with breaks and an afternoon nap, until 9pm, during which there are seven hours of prayer and Koran reading and only 3 1/2 hours for "natural sciences, social sciences, reading and writing".

Baihaqi says he recruits new students in Papua every year and swears parents give their consent. But the children only travel home every three years. They don't miss their parents, he says, and the parents knowingly agree to the arrangement.

Arist Merdeka Sirait, the head of Indonesia's non-government child protection group Komnas PA, says separating children for that long "means erasing their cultural roots", particularly if their names and religion are also changed. "It is very dangerous," he adds. But Indonesia's powerful Religious Affairs Ministry has no problem with it. It's encouraged, in fact, says pesantren division director Saefudin, because, "The longer you stay [in a pesantren], the more blessing you'll get."

The Indonesian government's Child Protection Commission, KPAI, is also sanguine. Deputy chairman Asrorun Ni'am, who is also a senior member of the Fatwa Council of the MUI, the government's Islamic advisory body, was more worried about the "religious sentiment" we might stir up by writing the story. "It's against all efforts to build harmonious atmosphere," he warned us.

The law is clear. The UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, to which Indonesia is a party, says children should not be separated from their families for whatever reason, even poverty. And Indonesia's Child Protection Act includes a five-year jail penalty for those who convert a child to religion different from their family's. In West Papua, religious leaders have little doubt that removing children is part of a broader effort to overwhelm the indigenous population; "It is Indonesia's long-term project to make Papua an Islamic place," says the head of the province's Baptist church, Socratez Yoman. "If Jakarta wants to educate Papuan children," says Christian leader Benny Giay, "why don't they build schools in Papua?"

We could not confirm if the government of Indonesia or its agencies were active in the movement of children. But some organisations have high level support. AFKN is funded by zakat (Islamic alms) delivered through the charitable arm of state-owned Indonesian bank BRI; Aloysius Kowenip talked of "local government" funding; Daarur Rasul's donors include "some police officers and military officers" acting personally, and at least one group was moved by a military plane.

Perhaps, like the well-documented movement of children in East Timor, the Papuan operation has no government endorsement but enjoys quiet consent at high levels of Indonesian society. Andreas Asso survived to tell his tale, but remains furious at how he was duped into leaving his highland home, then abandoned to his fate.

"I could have had an education there in Wamena. Some of my friends who stayed have graduated from school ... My dream job is to become a policeman. But I look back, and I've achieved nothing."

This article originally appeared in Good Weekend. Like Good Weekend on Facebook to get regular updates on upcoming stories and events – http://www.facebook.com/GoodWeekendMagazine

Mob Rule Has Deep Roots in Indonesian History

http://thejakartaglobe.beritasatu.com/opinion/johannes-nugroho-mob-rule-deep-roots-indonesian-history/
By Johannes Nugroho


The Islamic Defenders Front (FPI) has made plenty of headlines in the past few years. (JG Photo/Yudhi Sukma Wijaya)

Just as Indonesia’s National Police celebrated their 69th anniversary on July 1, at the Wonogondang Camping Ground in Cangkringan, in Yogyakarta’s district of Sleman, about 1,500 participants of the Seventh-day Adventist Church 2015 Pathfinder Club Camporee had their event broken up by the hard-line Islamic Jihad Front (FJI). In a blatant breach of the rule of law, the FJI received the backing of the local police force.

The chief of Cangkringan Police, Adj. Comr. Rubiyanto, told the press: “The organizers of the event couldn’t produce the required permits. Since this is supposed to be a national event, they should have obtained permits from the National Police headquarters, or at least the provincial headquarters.”

However, it appears that the management of the camping ground had in fact secured a permit with the Cangkringan Police. No further permit had been mentioned  until the FJI mob turned up to protest, claiming that the event was an attempt at “christianization.” FJI was adamant that the event be canceled, especially in light of the missing permits, threatening it would muster a greater mob if the police refused to shut down the event.

“All thanks be to the Almighty that the Christian scout [sic] event at Cangkringan has been dispersed. This is a lesson for everyone to take care not to offend Muslims, especially during Ramadan,” said Muhammad Fuad, commander of  the Islamic Community Forum (FUI) Yogyakarta, an affiliate of FJI.

The organizers of the camp in the end had no choice but to relocate the event. An organizer from Jakarta, Wenny Francisca Tumbelaka, poignantly wrote: “I felt sorry for the children. The food we sent them was confiscated by those people, and they ended up eating all the food, too.”

The question remains whether the event could have gone ahead undisturbed even if organizers had secured all the permits. After all, the police have in the past often cited “public unrest” as a valid reason to break up any event.

It’s worth noting that Sleman was also where a previous attack on the house belonging to a man named Julius Felicianus occurred in June 2014. The same hard-line Muslim crowds were responsible, claiming that Julius’ house had been used for holding church services. Although police officers were present when the mob attacked and trashed the house, they merely stood by.

Historically, what has to be called ‘mob power’ has always been present in modern Indonesia. Its first  calculated use by Indonesian independence fighters was in 1945, around the time of Japan’s surrender to the Allied Forces. At the end of the Japanese Occupation, and pending power transfer to the Allies, mobs ran amok attacking Japanese troops and later also the incoming Allied and Dutch troops.

Mob power played a crucial role in the lead-up to and during the 1945 Battle of Surabaya. Plenty of Japanese armories and warehouses were attacked by the Surabaya “kampung” mobs numbering tens of thousands at times and had their contents wiped clean.

Later on, when the British troops landed in October 1945, they suddenly found themselves facing urban guerrilla warfare waged by Indonesian militias equipped with Japanese guns, and lurking behind them the fearless kampung mobs. The frenzied mobs became the British infantrymen’s nightmare. The power of “amuk massa” lay with the terror their numbers brought.

Unfortunately for Indonesia, the tradition of mob power survived well into the times of the republic. Mob attacks were especially entrenched in the political sphere as they became a tool for parties and organizations with which to intimidate their rivals. The then hugely popular Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) relied on this method to overpower its enemies and those of president Sukarno, when it became the president’s protégé.

In December 1963, for example, PKI thugs across the country started enforcing land reform laws and confiscating land from private citizens, alienating many Indonesians in the process. The British Embassy was also overrun by PKI demonstators and incinerated. In late 1964, pro-Sukarno mobs attacked and burned down the US Information Service libraries in Jakarta and Surabaya. On Sept. 11, 1965, the Indian Embassy in Jakarta was ransacked and burned by crowds protesting against India’s support for Malaysia during Confrontation. It came as no surprise when anti-communist forces in Indonesia struck back during the 1965 and 1966 Communist Purge, mob attacks were also used to deadly effect.

Nowadays, hard-line groups, whether claiming to be religious like the Islamic Defenders Front (FPI) or FUI, or nationalist like Pemuda Pancasila, also employ the same methods of intimidation and mob terror. Last month a poet and artist from Kendal, Central Java, had his house besieged by PP members for allegedly planning  a “communist” art performance.

The Indonesian police have stated that there is very little they can do when menacing large mobs are involved in an incident. Yet it is exactly the reluctance of the state apparatus to bring mob power under the control of the law which enables the reign of terror to continue. Without rule of law, a truly functioning democracy will forever be out of Indonesia’s reach.

Johannes Nugroho is a writer from Surabaya. He can be contacted at johannes@nonacris.com.

Habib Luthfi bin Yahya

https://www.facebook.com/wargaKBGD/photos/a.10152087918540690.1073741849.52807600689/10153314170700690/?type=1

Hizbut Tahrir: Anti Demokrasi tapi Hidup berkat Demokrasi

http://www.madinaonline.id/wacana/hizbut-tahrir-anti-demokrasi-tapi-hidup-berkat-demokrasi/

Pada 30 Mei 2015, Gelora Bung Karno Jakarta dipenuhi lebih dari seratus ribu pendukung Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia yang berkumpul untuk menyelenggarakan acara Konsolidasi Rapat dan Pawai Akbar (RPA) HTI. Pada dasarnya, mereka menegaskan kembali komitmen mereka untuk menegakkan Khilafah yang mendasarkan diri pada Syariah di Indonesia. Rapat akbar itu adalah puncak dari rangkaian acara serupa di 36 kota di Indonesia.

Melalui rapat akbar itu, para pimpinan HTI kembali mengingatkan bahwa keterpurukan Indonesia – dan negara-negara Islam lainnya — saat ini hanya bisa diselesaikan bila umat Islam bersatu menegakkan sebuah Khilafah di dunia islam

HT Indonesia adalah bagian penting Hizbut Tahrir Internasional. Dengan jumlah umat Islam yang luar biasa besar, Indonesia memang menjadi salah satu wilayah yang menentukan keberhasilan HT Internasional untuk menegakkan cita-cita mereka: menegakkan kembali kejayaan Khilafah Islam.

Hizbut Tahrir adalah organisasi internasional yang menyempal dari kelompok Ikhwanul Muslimun (IM), ‘saudara tua’ PKS. Pendiri HT, Taqiuddin al-Nabhani, adalah mantan orang penting IM. Namun, karena ia menilai IM terlalu moderat dan akomodatif terhadap Barat, al-Nabhani akhirnya keluar dan mendirikan HT pada 1952.

HT menolak demokrasi dan gagasan-gagasan dari Barat. Menurut HT, Barat telah meracuni pikiran umat Islam dengan gagasan-gagasan seperti demokrasi, nasionalisme, sosialisme, kapitalisme, dan lainnya. Semua gagasan itu, menurut HT, telah menyebabkan umat Islam terjerumus dalam kondisi tak berdaya, baik secara budaya maupun politik, dan menjauhkan umat Islam dari syariatnya sendiri.

Karena itu, HT kemudian mengusung ide mendirikan Khilafah Islamiyah sebagai kekuasaan politik global yang seharusnya memerintah semua umat Islam yang ada di muka bumi.

Berbeda dengan sistem pemerintahan di dunia saat ini, Khilafah tidak dibatasi batas negara-bangsa. Seorang Khalifah, yaitu pemimpin Khilafah, adalah pemimpin umat Islam dengan kekuasaan politik di seluruh dunia. Dengan demikian seluruh umat Islam dunia – yang menempati Darul Islam – idealnya tunduk pada hanya satu Khalifah.

Konsep Khilafah ini merujuk pada perkembangan Islam di masa lalu. Selama sekitar 14 abad, ada begitu banyak Khalifah berkuasa. Pada awalnya, seusai Nabi Muhammad wafat, posisi itu secara bergantian diisi empat sahabat Nabi (Abu Bakar Shiddiq, Umar bin Khattab, Utsman bin Affan, Ali bin Abi Thalib). Seusai Ali kepemimpinan dunia Islam dipegang sejumlah dinasti, termasuk Bani Umayyah, Bani Abbasiyah, Bani Fatimiyah dan terakhir Utsmaniyah.

Era Khilafah Islam ini berakhir pada Maret 1924, dengan tumbangnya Khilafah Ustman yang berkuasa di Turki. Sejak saat itu, dunia Islam ‘terpecah’ menjadi puluhan negara yang berdiri terpisah dan berdaulat yang di pimpin seorang kepala negara di wilayahnya.

HT ingin mengembalikan kejayaan Khalifah tersebut. Hingga saat ini, HT terus menyebar ke berbagai negara yang yang umumnya demokratis, termasuk di Indonesia. Sebagai catatan, bukan hanya HT yang menjual isu khilafah untuk menarik dukungan dan simpati. Ada dua gerakan keislaman terkemuka saat ini yang juga melakukan hal serupa, yaitu Boko Haram di Nigeria, dan ISIS di Irak dan Suriah. Bedanya, HT tidak percaya pada jalan kekerasan untuk mencapai tujuan politik.

Di Indonesia, HT masuk pada 1980an, melalui kampus-kampus besar seperti Institut Pertanian Bogor. Pada awalnya mereka hadir secara sembunyi-sembunyi melalui jaringan halaqah (kelompok kecl beranggotakan 5-10 orang) di berbagai komunitas.

Sejak era reformasi, HTI tampil dengan lebih mengemuka. HTI bahkan menyelenggarakan Konferensi Internasional Khhilafah Islamiyah di Jakarta. HTI juga lazim melakukan acara publik untuk mengkampanyekan penegakan Khilafah. Dalam pemilu 2014, HTI tampil mendukung salah satu kandidat presiden. Salah seorang penceramah Islam populer, Felix Siauw, juga secara terbuka terus menyuarakan arti penting Khilafah.

Ancaman bagi Indonesia

HTI memang terus tumbuh. Namun sebenarnya pertumbuhan ini dapat dilihat sebagai masalah – kalau bukan acaman – bagi Indonesia.

Masalah utama HTI adalah mereka percaya pada konsep pemerintahan yang bertentangan sepenuhnya dengan konsep NKRI. Dalam pandangan HT, Islam sudah memberikan semacam cetak biru pemerintahan yang harus dijalankan di sepanjang masa. HT memutlakkan konsep Khilafah sebagai satu-satunya model pemerintahan dalam Islam. Padahal al-Quran dan hadis hanya memberikan panduan kepada umat berupa prinsip-prinsip dasar (mabadi` asasiyyah) bagaimana bernegara dan mengelola masyarakat. Prinsip-prinsip dasar itu di antaranya keharusan adanya pemimpim, menaati pemimpin, bermusyawarah untuk mencari solusi permasalahan, dan lain sebagainya.

Dengan prinsip-prinsip dasar di atas, al-Quran dan hadis sebenarnya memberikan kepercayaan yang begitu besar kepada umat untuk merancang dan mengelola sistem pemerintahannya sendiri yang sesuai dengan kebutuhan zaman dan tempat mereka. Dengan kata lain, al-Quran dan hadis sendiri yang menghendaki munculnya keragaman tafsir di antara umat soal bagaimana bernegara dan mengelola masyarakat.

Dengan keyakinan tentang kesaktian cetak biru Khilafah itu, sikap HT menjadi tidak realistis. HT bermimpi bahwa Khilafah bisa menyelesaikan semua permasalahan umat dan kemanusiaan yang tak kunjung teratasi, seperti kemiskinan, ketidakberdayaan, ketidakadilan, dan lain sebagainya. Khilafah, bagi HT itu semacam ramuan ajaib yang mampu menyembuhkan segala penyakit kronis dalam waktu cepat.

Dalam hal ini, HT terjkesan tidak sadar zaman. Model pemerintahan yang pernah dipraktikkan oleh para sahabat Nabi al-Khulafa` al-Rasyidun (yang demokratis) dan model khilafah sesudahnya (yang monarkis) adalah model pemerintahan yang sesuai dengan zamannya. Dilihat dari kecenderungan dalam satu abad terakhir, konsep negara-bangsa (nation states) kini menjadi alternatif model bernegara yang paling sejalan dengan perkembangan peradaban dunia.

Karena keyakinannya itu pula, HT menjadi bersikap menentang konsep NKRI. Indonesia dibentuk untuk mewadahi seluruh elemen bangsa yang majemuk dalam hal suku, bahasa, budaya dan agama. Untuk mengikat seluruh masyarakat, kemudian dibuat perjanjian luhur seperti yang tertuang dalam Pancasila UUD 45. Jika ikatan sosial ini dihapuskan, maka Indonesia bubar dengan sendirinya. HT Indonesia adalah salah satu gerakan yang mengancam keutuhan Indonesia. Dalam berbagai kesempatan, HT Indonesia dengan terang-terangan ingin mengubah Pancasila dan konstitusi Indonesia dengan khilafah.

Pada tarikan napas yang sama, HT menolak demokrasi. Bagi HT, bukan saja konsep ‘kedaulatan rakyat’ itu salah, namun demokrasi juga adalah sistem yang boros karena secara berkala harus menyelenggarakan pemilu. Menurut HT, demokrasi mendorong perilaku korup di kalangan pejabat negara. Sementara dalam khilafah, menurut pandangan naïf HT pula, seorang penguasa tidak akan korupsi karena dia bisa terus menjabat seumur hidup selama tidak melangar aturan tanpa harus mempersiapkan diri dalam pemilu.

Ironisnya, meski HTI anti demokrasi, keberadannya di berbagai negara dimungkinkan karena demokrasi. Karena sistem demokrasi percaya pada hak masyarakat berpendirian dan berserikat, HT bisa merasakan nikmatnya diberikan kebebasan untuk membangun organisasi dan bentuk perwakilannya di 45 negara. Kantor pusat  HT pun berada di salah satu jantung demokrasi Eropa: Inggris. Dan Indonesia adalah kantong terbesar HT, satu dari sekian negara demokrasi terbesar di dunia. HT justru tidak diterima di Timur-tengah karena kawasan itu tidak demokratis.

(Irwan Amrizal)

10 Sesat Pikir Hizbut Tahrir

http://www.madinaonline.id/wacana/perspektif/10-sesat-pikir-hizbut-tahrir/

Bagi sebagian umat Islam, retorika Hizbut Tahrir tentang mengembalikan kejayaan Islam melalui sistem kepemimpinan Khilafah mungkin terkesan menarik. Namun kalau dipelajari, sistem pemerintahan yang ditawarkan sebenarnya mengandung banyak persoalan serius.

Berikut sejumlah cacat pikir sistem Khilafah yang ditawarkan HT.

Pertama, HT memutlakkan konsep Khilafah sebagai satu-satunya model pemerintahan dalam Islam. Dalam konsep ini, HT tidak percaya bahwa Indonesia boleh berdiri independen sebagai sebuah negara bangsa. HT percaya bahwa kaum muslim Indonesia harus tunduk pada pemerintahan Khilafah dunia Islam di bawah seorang Khalifah yang mungkin saja berada di negara lain (misalnya di Arab Saudi atau di Iraq atau di tempat lain). Pemimpin pemerintahan di Indonesia harus tunduk pada Khalifah itu.

Kedua, sebagai konsekuensi dari pandangan pertama, HT tidak percaya pada konsep Negara Kesatuan RI yang berdaulat. Indonesia adalah bagian dari Khilafah Islam. Indonesia adalah semacam ‘negara bagian’ dari Khilafah. Bila Indonesia menolak keputusan Khalifah, pemimpin di Indonesia bisa diganti. Lebih buruk lagi, bila Indonesia tetap menolak setelah ada ancaman sanksi oleh Khalifah, Indonesia bisa diperangi.

Ketiga, HT tidak percaya pada Pancasila, pada UUD 45 dan segenap rujukan konstitusi negara Indonesia. HT tidak percaya pada demokrasi, tidak percaya pada pemilu. Bila saat ini HT menerimanya, itu hanya untuk sementara. Dalam bayangan HT, suatu saat nanti Indonesia harus diubah menjadi menjadi bagian dari Khilafah Islam.

Keempat, HT menomorduakan warga non-Islam. Dengan kata lain, HT diskriminatif. Dalam konsep Khilafah Islam yang dibayangkan HT, kaum, non-Islam adalah warga kelas dua. Melalui jargon izzul Islam wal muslimin (kejayaan Islam dan orang-orang Islam), HT menganakemaskan kelompok Muslim seraya menganaktirikan kelompok yang lain. Ini tidak berarti warga non-Islam tidak mendapat pelayanan pendidikan, sosial, ekonomi, dan sebagainya. Tapi kaum non-muslim tidak memiliki hak politik yang sama, misalnya dalam hal memilih pemimpin.

Kelima, dalam Khilafah yang dibayangkan HT, kalaulah ada partai politik, maka partai politik itu haruslah berupa partai politik Islam. Kalaulah ada pemilu, pemilu tersebut hanya boleh diikuti umat Islam.

Keenam, pemilu pada dasarnya hanyalah pilihan terakhir. Yang ideal dalam pola pemilihan pemimpin adalah pemilihan melalui keputusan organisasi semacam majelis alim-ulama yang mempersatukan para ulama dan cerdik pandai. Dalam hal ini setiap negara yang menjadi bagian dari Khilafah (misalnya saja Indonesia, Malaysia, Brunei, Iraq dan seterusnya) akan mengajukan nama para calonnya yang akan ditetapkan semacam Majelis Sentral Alim Ulama di pusat Khilafah.

Ketujuh, HT tidak percaya pada parlemen yang mengendalikan Khalifah dan pemerintah. Dalam konsep HT, begitu seorang pemimpin terpilih dan dibaiat (disumpah), seluruh rakyat dalam Khilafah harus tunduk dan percaya padanya. Si pemimpin kemudian harus menjalankan kepemimpinan dengan senantiasa merujuk pada Syariah. Ia lah yang menunjuk para pembantunya, termasuk menunjuk pemimpin di setiap daerah yang menjadi bagian dari Khilafah.

Kedelapan, dalam konsep ini seorang Khalifah tidak memiliki batas waktu kepemimpinan. Dia baru diganti kalau wafat, tidak lagi melandaskan kepemimpinannya pada Syariah atau memimpin dengan cara yang zalim. Bila ia melanggar Syariah, ia boleh ditumbangkan dengan kekerasan.

Kesembilan, selama ia masih memimpin berdasarkan Syariah, keputusan Khalifah tidak boleh tidak dituruti. Rakyat dan para alim ulama, kaum cerdik pandai, bisa saja memberi masukan, namun keputusan terakhir da di tangan Khalifah. Mereka yang berani tidak taat akan dianggap sebagai melakukan pembangkangan. Dan mereka yang membangkang bisa dihukum mati.

Kesepuluh, HT anti-keragaman hukum. HT menganggap tidak perlu ada UU yang dibuat oleh para wakil rakyat. HT percaya Syariah saja sudah cukup. Namun bila memang ada kebutuhan untuk mengeluarkan peraturan, Khalifah dan pembantu-pembantunya dapat saja membuat peraturan yang mengikat seluruh warga.

Itulah setidaknya sepuluh persoalan serius dalam tawaran konsep Khilafah menurut HT yang jelas-jelas bertentangan dengan gagasan NKRI dan demokrasi. Masih ada yang tertarik?

Titik Temu Sunni-Syiah

http://koran.tempo.co/konten/2015/03/20/368204/Titik-Temu-Sunni-Syiah
Ahmad Hifni
Peneliti Moderate Muslim Society (MMS)

Sunni dan Syiah merupakan dua mazhab yang paling penting dalam Islam, dengan sebagian besar umat Islam di dunia menggunakan keduanya sebagai pijakan utama.

Dalam perspektif historis, sesungguhnya para imam Syiah dan ulama Sunni pada masa lampau tidak mempertentangkan perbedaan ijtihad mereka. Setiap orang saling menghargai dan tidak ada yang saling melecehkan ijtihad masing-masing. Mereka memahami bahwa mereka bagian dari keluarga umat Islam. Faktanya, mereka hidup berbaur dan tidak sedikit pun menyalakan api perpecahan.

Hubungan harmonis tersebut terlihat dari hubungan para pemuka mazhab, seperti Zayd bin Ali, imam Syiah Zaidiyah yang belajar fikih dan dasar akidah dari Abu Hanifah, salah satu imam Sunni. Sedangkan Abu Hanifah belajar hadis dan ilmu-ilmu lainnya dari imam Ja'far Shadiq, imam Syiah. Mereka tidak berbeda pendapat perihal fundamen agama, perbedaan terjadi dalam memahami hukum-hukum yang bersifat partikular (al-ahkam al-far'iyyah). Karena itu, perbedaan mereka dalam hal-hal yang parsial, sejatinya merupakan rahmat, berkah, potensi, dan keluasan.

Kondisi tersebut terus bertahan hingga pertengahan abad IV Hijriah dan mulai melemah pada masa dinasti Abbasiah. Mereka kemudian terpetakan dalam polarisasi akibat faksionalisasi politik. Konsekuensinya, lahirlah fanatisme mazhab sebagai cikal-bakal munculnya permusuhan antara Sunni dan Syiah. Ulama dari kedua mazhab tersebut mempersempit kajiannya pada apa yang dipelajari dari imam dan syekhnya (baca: ulama besar), lalu fanatik, kemudian menyerang dengan keras pandangan yang tidak sejalan dengan dirinya.

Sektarianisme Sunni-Syiah terus berkembang akibat pengaruh politik. Kolonialisme memecah belah persatuan umat Islam, khususnya Zionisme yang menggunakan kekuatan militer dan segala tipu daya lainnya. Sungguh yang lebih memprihatinkan, politik friksionis yang dilakukan oleh kolonialisme Zionis sangat aktif dan dinamis di sejumlah dunia Islam hingga saat ini. Mereka memperjualbelikan konflik dengan mengatasnamakan agama.

Padahal, konflik yang terjadi di antara kalangan Sunni dan Syiah sungguh merupakan konflik politik dan bukan konflik keagamaan. Konflik politik akan mengakibatkan luka yang sangat mendalam, sedangkan konflik keagamaan menjadi rahmat.

Perbedaan mendasar dalam kedua konflik tersebut adalah, pertama, konflik sektarian dan bernuansa politik. Konflik ini menanam kebencian di dalam hati sanubari umat, sehingga memporak-porandakan persatuan umat. Maka, meluruskan konflik yang bernuansa sektarian dan politis merupakan sebuah keniscayaan, karena konflik itu dapat menumbuhkan nalar dan sikap diskriminatif di kalangan umat Islam.

Kedua, konflik bernuansa keagamaan, khususnya fikih dan mazhab. Konflik pada ranah ini bukanlah persoalan, karena membuktikan dinamika dan revitalisasi. Konflik tersebut dibangun atas dasar perdebatan dengan menggunakan berbagai perspektif, analisis, dan tradisi keagamaan. Sejauh perdebatan menggunakan sumber yang sama, yaitu Al-Quran, sunah, dan tidak mengingkari dasar-dasar yang sudah mapan.

Tidak ada perbedaan perihal fundamen agama antara Sunni dan Syiah. Sebagaimana para imam mazhab Sunni yang sangat populer, yaitu imam Abu Hanifah, imam Malik, imam Ahmad bin Hanbal, dan imam Syafi'i, adalah para ulama yang mempunyai tempat terhormat di mata para ulama fikih Syiah. Sebaliknya, para ulama fikih Sunni tidak mengabaikan keberadaan ulama fikih ahlul bait, mereka menganggap imam Ja'far Shadiq sebagai ulama fikih yang paling cemerlang pada zamannya.

Adapun ulama-ulama Sunni menerima lebih seratus orang perawi hadis dari kalangan Syiah. Sebaliknya, kalangan Syiah juga menerima hadis dari kalangan sunni seperti dikatakan Syekh Muhammad Hasan Shadar dalam kitabnya Al-Syiah, "Syiah selalu menerima hadis dari kalangan Sunni, apabila diketahui perawinya jujur dan kuat hafalannya." Di sinilah dapat kita temui fakta historis titik temu Sunni-Syiah.

Ketika konflik Sunni-Syiah terus terjadi akibat friksi politik, justru di seantero dunia umat manusia membangun aliansi dalam komunitas. Mereka berbondong-bondong membangun kesepakatan bisnis dan politik, meskipun berbeda keyakinan, prinsip, ideologi, dan pandangan. Pertanyaannya, mengapa umat Islam, baik Sunni maupun Syiah, tidak membangun kekuatan besar? Bukankah Tuhan kita satu, nabi kita satu, kitab suci kita satu, dan kiblat ibadah kita juga satu?

Tidak dimungkiri lagi, faktor utama yang menyebabkan jatuhnya umat Islam adalah keterbelahan dalam berbagai golongan, aliran, dan partai. Padahal Islam merupakan agama yang mempunyai tujuan mulia untuk melanjutkan tonggak pilar kemanusiaan sebagai landasan bagi tegaknya kebenaran, keadilan, dan kesetaraan, khususnya dalam membangun masyarakat yang humanis, aman, tenteram, dan sejahtera.

Kenyataannya, sangat ironis, penganut mazhab Sunni dan Syiah mudah terjerumus dalam konspirasi pihak ketiga. Sikap kita selama ini seolah-olah memberikan angin segar bagi misi yang dilancarkan mereka untuk memecah belah persatuan umat Islam.