Wednesday, November 9, 2011

The Roots of Moderate Islam in Indonesia

By Mun’im Sirry


Over the past few years we have witnessed the growing number of Western scholars exploring the particularity of Indonesian Islam from that of the Middle East. This is true not only to the extent that some Indonesianists such as Robert Hefner of Boston University are successfully demonstrating that Indonesia is not a periphery of the Muslim World, but also able to point out certain elements of its distinct and attractive features.

Apart from the fact that Indonesia is home of the largest Muslim community in the world, Islam in Indonesia has ostensibly gained more attention in the Western scholarship. A distinguished scholar of Middle East, Dr. Bassam Tibbi, for instance, calls Indonesia as a model for the Islamic civilization in transition to the 21st century. He bases his argument on the ground that “It represents a model for religiously and ethnic-culturally different communities to live together in peace and mutual respect.”

Another expert of Middle Eastern Islam, Giora Eliraz of Hebrew University at Jerusalem – who shifted his intellectual interest to Indonesia – in his recent work, Islam in Indonesia (2004), argues that although the Middle East has had significant impact on Islam in Indonesia, but once certain Islamic ideas and streams of thoughts diffused to Indonesia from the Middle East, they underwent some modifications and exhibited an inclusive and pluralist character.

To make his point, Eliraz refers to the “venture” of the ideas of the great Egyptian reformer Muhammad Abduh to the country. While in his homeland (Egypt) Abduh’s progressive idea gained support only among a tiny group of reformers, in Indonesia it transformed into the largest modernist Muslim organization, Muhammadiyah, which along with the traditionalist organization NU (Nahdhatul Ulama) represents the mainstream of Moderate Islam in Indonesia.

The question now arises: What explains this moderation, in contrast to the explosive growth of militancy in so many Muslim majority countries? There are probably several parts to a complete answer. Some argues that the moderate feature of Indonesian Islam can be traced back to the way in which Islam was firstly introduced to the archipelago by foreign traders. The culture developing along the coast under the influence of the traders included traits like egalitarianism, dynamism, entrepreneurship, and independence, which affected the ideology and practice of Islam in the country significantly. As a result, the Indonesian people are now basically egalitarian in their outlook, an important ingredient for a functioning tolerance.

In line with this argument is the fact that the type of Islam that entered into the archipelago was sufistic in nature. This makes Indonesian Muslims very receptive to the local context which eventually leads them to an inclusive understanding of who and what can be considered Islamic. In 1960s the renowned American anthropologist Clifford Greertz drew a line between abangan (syncretist Muslims) and santri (practicing Muslims) to indicate the diverse religious orientations in the country.

However, one should not forget that there was a long history of moderation among both the traditionalists and the modernists. NU had in the 1930s issued a fatwa (religious degree) declaring Dutch rule legitimate. The early leaders of Muhammadiyah focused more on internal reform (tajdid), making better Muslim one by one, as opposed to capturing the state in the name of Islam.

In addition, we may take into account some recent developments that make this religious and political moderation among Indonesian Muslims is possible. First, much credit must be given to a remarkably creative and dedicated group of young religious and social thinkers and activists who chose early in the New Order of Suharto regime to reject the Islamic state approach. At the height of the New Order’s political repression of Islam during the late 1970s and early 1980s, new pattern of thinking emerged in the umma (Muslim community), particularly among younger intellectuals, which would have a major impact on the nature of political articulation of Islam. This phenomenon, which was initially called the “reform movement” (gerakan pembaruan), is perhaps best summed up in Nurcholish Madjid’s 1972’s dictum: ‘Islam yes, Islamic party no.’ This new generation is, to large extent, quite successful in desacralizing the notion of Islamic state.

Second, at the same time, the New Order’s own stance towards Islam began to change from the late 1980s. A series of legislative and institutional concession to Islamic sentiment provided tangible evidence of this. Prominent among them were the promulgation of Islamic family law in 1989, the establishment of ICMI (Indonesian Muslim Intellectual Association) in 1990, lifting a ban on female state school students wearing jilbab (head cover) in 1991, the founding of an Islamic bank (Bank Muamalat) in 1992, and abolition of the state lottery. All these gave a strong impression to Muslims that they could live in accordance with Islamic teaching even though the state is not Islamic one.

Third, the tendency toward a moderation has also something to do the success that Islamic institute of learning has had played in enlightening Indonesian Muslims, especially UIN (State Islamic University). There are 27 UINs throughout Indonesia along with a hundred of STAINs (State Institute of Islamic Studies) which introduce a progressive understanding of Islam.

Fourth and yet more importantly is the introduction of a new way of understanding Islam especially by those who studied in the West. At least, in the last two decades, we have witnessed an increasing number of Muslim students fromIndonesia enrolled in various Western universities. Many people, including myself, think that this can partly be explained by the shifting direction of study among Muslim societies of Southeast Asia from the Middle East to the West. When these students return to their home country, they promote different approaches to the study of Islam – approaches in which Islam is no more seen as a static object, but rather as a dynamic process of understanding. It seems that those who studied in the West are well-equipped with methodologies and research capabilities so as to present an “Islam” more adaptable and amendable to social change.

It is worth mentioning that many Indonesian students who pursued their graduate studies in the West occupy the highest position of influence in Indonesia, academically and politically. They are also able to develop a different picture of Islam – an Islam that is compatible with the modern notions of human achievements, such as democracy, human rights, civil society, etc. Just to give an illustration: three prominent American Muslim scholars – Ismail al-Faruqi (1921-1986) from Palestine, Fazlur Rahman (1919-1988) from Pakistan, and Seyyed Hossein Nasr (b. 1933) from Iran, who are generally regarded as among the best known and intellectually influential Muslim scholars of the twentieth century, and whose ideas and thoughts are not welcomed in their respective countries, but Indonesian Muslims have taken the historic step of welcoming them and their ideas when they were not welcomed in their native lands.

I think it is not an exaggeration or even overly optimistic to say that this recent development will pave the way for the emergence of what we may call a “moderate Islamic network” between the United States and Indonesia.

Mun’im Sirry, Indonesian Muslim scholar and author of several books, including Resisting Religious Militancy (Jakarta: Airlangga, 2003).

Benarkah Habib itu keturunan Nabi SAW? Masih Diragukan !

http://www.rimanews.com/read/20111105/45824/benarkah-habib-itu-keturunan-nabi-saw-masih-diragukan
Sabtu, 5 Nov 2011 01:53 WIB




CHICAGO,RIMANEWS-  Cendekiawan Muslim dari Paramadina, A.Mun'im Sirry MA, kandidat PhD di University of Chicago, AS mempertanyakan bahwa Apakah mereka yang mengaku sayyid atau habib itu betul-betul keturunan Baginda Nabi?

Menurutnya, Dalam studi yg dilakukan sejumlah ahli genetika, sebagian besar orang yang mengaku ngaku sayyid itu sebenarnya bukan keturunan Nabi. M.R. Rafiee, A. Sokhansanj, Naghizadeh dan Farazmand melakukan uji DNA di Iran sementara Elise Belle, Saima Shah, Tudor Parfitt dan Mark Thomas di India-Pakistan.


Hasil penelitian mereka sama: Mereka yang mengaku sayyid atau habib itu bukan keturunan Nabi. Lho, kalau di Iran dan India-Subcontinent saja tidak benar, bagaimana dgn orang-orang mengaku sayyid dan habib di Indonesia? Jelasnya, sayyid dan habib itu adalah konstruk sosial utk tujuan kehormatan dan legitimasi.


Dalam kesempatan lain, Munim Sirry menyingkapkan bahwa banyak ulama dan intelektual Muslim mengagumi reformasi dalam Kristen, hingga ada yang menyebut mereka itu "Muslim Luther." Tapi, kekaguman Muhammad 'Abduh terhadap reformasi Kristen melebihi ulama-ulama lain. 'Abduh dgn sangat gamblang menuturkan kekagumannya dalam Risala al-tawhid-nya yang sudah menjadi klasik itu. Beliau mengatakan, misalnya, bahwa Kristen-nya para reformer itu sudah sangat dekat dgn Islam.


Bahkan, katanya dalam facebook lebih lanjut, agama mereka itu tdk ada bedanya dgn agama yang dibawa Nabi Muhammad kecuali beda nama. Termasuk dalam hal ibadah, kata 'Abduh, hanya beda dalam bentuk, bukan substansi. Saya tdk tahu, apakah ada ulama yang membuat pengakuan lebih gamblang dan tegas dari mufti besar ini, bahkan dari aktivis-aktivis lintas agama sekarang.

Opini: Keislaman Indonesia

http://nasional.kompas.com/read/2011/11/05/09034780/Keislaman.Indonesia
Oleh Komaruddin HidayatRektor UIN Syarif Hidayatullah, Jakarta





Sebuah penelitian sosial bertema ”How Islamic are Islamic Countries” menilai Selandia Baru berada di urutan pertama negara yang paling islami di antara 208 negara, diikuti Luksemburg di urutan kedua. Sementara Indonesia yang mayoritas penduduknya Muslim menempati urutan ke-140.

Adalah Scheherazade S Rehman dan Hossein Askari dari The George Washington University yang melakukan penelitian ini. Hasilnya dipublikasikan dalam Global Economy Journal (Berkeley Electronic Press, 2010). Pertanyaan dasarnya adalah seberapa jauh ajaran Islam dipahami dan memengaruhi perilaku masyarakat Muslim dalam kehidupan bernegara dan sosial?

Ajaran dasar Islam yang dijadikan indikator dimaksud diambil dari Al Quran dan hadis, dikelompokkan menjadi lima aspek. Pertama, ajaran Islam mengenai hubungan seseorang dengan Tuhan dan hubungan sesama manusia. Kedua, sistem ekonomi dan prinsip keadilan dalam politik serta kehidupan sosial. Ketiga, sistem perundang-undangan dan pemerintahan. Keempat, hak asasi manusia dan hak politik. Kelima, ajaran Islam berkaitan dengan hubungan internasional dan masyarakat non-Muslim.

Setelah ditentukan indikatornya, lalu diproyeksikan untuk menimbang kualitas keberislaman 56 negara Muslim yang menjadi anggota Organisasi Kerja Sama Islam (OKI), yang rata-rata berada di urutan ke-139 dari sebanyak 208 negara yang disurvei.

Pengalaman UIN Jakarta
Kesimpulan penelitian di atas tak jauh berbeda dari pengalaman dan pengakuan beberapa ustaz dan kiai sepulang dari Jepang setelah kunjungan selama dua minggu di Negeri Sakura. Program ini sudah berlangsung enam tahun atas kerja sama Universitas Islam Negeri (UIN) Syarif Hidayatullah, Jakarta, dengan Kedutaan Besar Jepang di Jakarta.

Para ustaz dan kiai itu difasilitasi untuk melihat dari dekat kehidupan sosial di sana dan bertemu sejumlah tokoh. Setiba di Tanah Air, hampir semua mengakui bahwa kehidupan sosial di Jepang lebih mencerminkan nilai-nilai Islam ketimbang yang mereka jumpai, baik di Indonesia maupun di Timur Tengah. Masyarakat terbiasa antre, menjaga kebersihan, kejujuran, suka menolong, dan nilai-nilai Islam lain yang justru makin sulit ditemukan di Indonesia.

Pernyataan serupa pernah dikemukakan Muhammad Abduh, ulama besar Mesir, setelah berkunjung ke Eropa. Saya lebih melihat Islam di Eropa, tetapi kalo orang Muslim banyak saya temukan di dunia Arab, katanya.


Kalo saja yang dijadikan indikator penelitian untuk menimbang  keberislaman  masyarakat itu ditekankan pada aspek ritual-individual, saya yakin Indonesia  menduduki peringkat pertama menggeser Selandia Baru. Jumlah yang pergi haji setiap tahun meningkat, selama Ramadhan masjid penuh dan pengajian semarak dimana-mana. Tidak kurang dari 20 stasiun televisi di Indonesia setiap hari pasti menyiarkan dakwah agama. Terlebih lagi selama bulan Ramadhan, hotel pun diramaikan oleh tarawih bersama. Ditambah lagi yang namanya ormas dan parpol Islam yang terus bermunculan.

Namun, pertanyaan yang kemudian dimunculkan oleh Rehman dan Askari bukan semarak ritual, melainkan seberapa jauh ajaran Islam itu membentuk kesalehan sosial berdasarkan ajaran Al Quran dan Hadis.

Contoh perilaku sosial di Indonesia yang sangat jauh dari ajaran Islam  adalah  maraknya korupsi, sistem ekonomi dengan bunga tinggi, kekayaan tidak merata,  persamaan hak bagi setiap warga Negara untuk memperoleh pelayanan Negara dan untuk berkembang, serta banyak aset sosial yang mubazir. Apa yang dikecam  ajaran Islam itu ternyata lebih mudah ditemukan di masyarakat Muslim ketimbang negara-negara Barat. Kedua peneliti itu menyimpulkan:

it is our belief that most self-declared and labeled Islamic countries are not conducting their affairs in accordance with Islamic teachings at least when it
comes
to economic, financial, political, legal, social and government policies.

Dari 56 negara anggota OKI, yang memperoleh nilai tertinggi adalah  Malaysia  (urutan ke-38), Kuwait (48), Uni Emirat Arab (66), Maroko (119), Arab Saudi (131), Indonesia (140), Pakistam (147), dan terburuk adalah Somalia (206).

Negara barat yang dinilai mendekati nilai-nilai Islam adalah Kanada di urutan ke-7, Inggris (8), Australia (9), dan Amerika Setikat (25).

Sekali lagi, penelitian ini tentu menyisakan banyak pertanyaan serius yang perlu juga dijawab melalui penelitian sebanding. Jika masyarakat atau negara Muslim korup dan represif, apakah kesalahan ini lebih disebabkan oleh perilaku masyarakatnya atau pada sistem pemerintahnya? Atau akibat sistem dan kultur pendidikan Islam yang salah? Namun, satu hal yang pasti, penelitian ini menyimpulkan bahwa perilaku sosial, ekonomi, dan politik negara-negara anggota OKI justru berjarak lebih jauh dari ajaran Islam dibandingkan negara-negara non-Muslim yang perilakunya lebih Islami.

Semarak dakwah dan ritual

Hasil penelitian ini juga menyisakan pertanyaan besar dan mendasar:  mengapa  semarak dakwah dan ritual keagamaan di Indonesia tidak mampu mengubah  perilaku sosial dan birokrasi sebagaimana yang diajarkan Islam, yang justru  dipraktikkan di negara-negara sekuler?


Tampaknya keberagamaan kita lebih senang di level dan semarak ritual untuk  mengejar kesalehan individual, tetapi menyepelekan kesalehan sosial. Kalau  seorang Muslim sudah melaksanakan lima rukun Islam shahadat, shalat, puasa,  zakat, haji dia sudah merasa sempurna. Semakin sering berhaji, semakin  sempurna dan hebatlah keislamannya. Padahal misi Rasulullah itu datang untuk membangun peradaban yang memiliki tiga pilar utama: kelimuan, ketakwaan, dan akhlak mulia atau integritas.  Hal yang terakhir inilah, menurut Rehman dan Askari, dunia Islam mengalami krisis.

Sekali lagi, kita boleh setuju atau menolak hasil penelitian ini dengan  cara  melakukan penelitian tandingan. Jadi jika ada pertanyaan: How Islamic are Islamic Political Parties?, menarik juga dilakukan penelitian dengan terlebih dahulu membuat indikator atau standar berdasarkan Al Quran dan Hadis. Lalu diproyeksikan juga untuk menakar keberislaman perilaku partai-partai yang mengusung simbol dan semangat agama dalam perilaku sosialnya. 

Sunday, September 25, 2011

Suicide Bombing at Indonesian Church Injures 22



http://www.nytimes.com/aponline/2011/09/25/world/asia/AP-AS-Indonesia-Church-Explosion.html?ref=asia




SOLO, Indonesia (AP) — A suicide bomber blew himself up inside an Indonesian church as hundreds of worshippers were filing out after the Sunday service, injuring at least 22 people, police said.
The bomber's mangled body lay at the entrance of the Tenth Bethel Gospel Church. Around him, screaming people were splattered in blood.
Police Chief Gen. Timur Pradopo said the low-intensity device appeared to be attached to the man's stomach.
"We are now waiting for DNA test results to confirm his identity," Pradopo said. "We hope to reveal it soon."
A woman working at an Internet cafe near the church in the Central Java town of Solo said the man had visited her shop an hour before the explosion and browsed websites about al-Qaida and a local Islamist group.
He left a bag behind containing a copy of the Quran, a mask and a cellphone charger, Rina Ristriningsih told The Associated Press. She said all of the items had been confiscated by police.
Indonesia, a predominantly Muslim nation of 237 million, has been hit by a string of suicide bombings blamed on the al-Qaida-linked network Jemaah Islamiyah and its offshoots since 2002, when a strike on two Bali nightclubs killed 202 people, most of them foreign tourists.
Subsequent attacks targeting restaurants and hotels have been far less deadly, however, and the last occurred more than two years ago, thanks in large to a security crackdown that led to the arrests and convictions of dozens of suspects.
But bombings by solo "jihadis" targeting Christians, security officers and Islamic sects deemed blasphemous by hard-liners have continued.
Djoko Suyanto, a top security minister, told reporters that Sunday's attack should serve as a reminder that prospective suicide bombers, some without clear motives, are still out there.
It appeared that the bomber entered the church through a side door, mingled with worshippers, and then, when the service was over, headed out with them.
He detonated his device near the entrance, killing himself and wounding at least 22 people, said Pradopo, the police chief.
"Everyone was screaming," Fani, a witness, told Metro TV. Like many Indonesians she goes by only one name.
"I saw fiery sparks and, near the entrance, a man dead on the ground, his entrails spilling out. People around him were splattered with blood."
Members of the congregation said they did not recognize the bomber.
"He walked about 4 meters (yards) behind me," Abraham, who attended the service, told El Shinta radio. "I believe he was disguised as a churchgoer."
Indonesia is a secular nation with a long history of religious tolerance, but a small extremist fringe has become more vocal — and violent — in recent years.
Critics say President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, who relies heavily on Islamic parties in parliament, has remained largely silent as minorities have been attacked by hard-liners or seen their houses of worship torched or closed.
However, he was quick to speak out after Sunday's attack.
"Whoever is behind such violence has to be arrested," he said, adding that neither religious nor ethnic differences can justify such actions. "Crime is crime, terrorism is terrorism."
Yudhoyono said there were indications the assailant may have been linked to a terror network in the West Java town of Cirebon that carried out a suicide attack on a mosque packed with police in April.
Thirty people were injured in that attack.
___
Associated Press writers Niniek Karmini and Ali Kotarumalos in Jakarta contributed to this report.

Indonesian Assault Victim Gets Harsher Sentence Than His Attackers

http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/16/world/asia/16indonesia.html?_r=1&ref=indonesia

DENPASAR, Indonesia — An Indonesian man who survived a deadly mob attack by Muslim hard-liners was sentenced Monday to six months in prison, prompting outrage from rights groups over a sentence harsher than those received by some of his assailants.
Associated Press
Deden Sudjana faces prison after surviving a mob attack.
Deden Sudjana, a member ofAhmadiyya, a minority Muslim sect that many conservative Muslims consider heretical, was found guilty by a district court in Banten Province on charges stemming from the attack in February. Judges said that he had refused police orders to leave the scene and that he had wounded one of the attackers.
The judges rejected a charge of incitement leveled by prosecutors, who had sought a sentence of nine months.
The clash, in the remote district of Cikeusik, caused outrage after a graphic video of it surfaced online. It showed the police offering little resistance as more than 1,000 villagers descended on a home where 21 Ahmadis were staying, killing three of them and then beating and stomping on their mud-covered bodies.
The attack and trial that followed were widely denounced as evidence of declining religious tolerance in Indonesia, where the police, government officials and the justice system have often appeared reluctant to punish — and, in some cases, are accused of having colluded with — Islamic hard-liners, who have engaged in increasingly frequent attacks on Christian churches and on properties owned by Ahmadiyya.
Last month the same court sentenced 12 villagers, including a 17-year-old seen in the video bashing a man’s skull with a rock, to three to six months in jail for their involvement in the attack. Prosecutors did not seek charges of murder or manslaughter.
In the court session on Monday, judges found that Mr. Sudjana, whose right hand was nearly severed in the attack, shared responsibility for the clash because he had helped to stockpile weapons in the Ahmadis’ home, and had resisted police calls to abandon the village, where clerics and villagers had consistently called for the Ahmadis’ departure.
“This sets a very dangerous precedent,” said Firdaus Mubarik, a spokesman for Ahmadiyya. “This decision delegitimizes the right of Ahmadis to defend themselves. It means that they can be punished if they defend themselves when their homes and mosques are attacked.”
Mr. Mubarik said light punishment in cases of sectarian violence only encouraged more attacks on Ahmadis, who are seen by many orthodox Muslims as violating the central tenet that Muhammad is the final prophet.
In the latest such episode, over the weekend, a mob reportedly led by an Islamist vigilante group, the Islamic Defenders Front, damaged Ahmadiyya buildings and assaulted people in the city of Makassar.
Human Rights Watch called on the Indonesian government to set up an independent inquiry into the trial, which “is appalling and smacks of injustice,” Elaine Pearson, the group’s deputy director for Asia, said in a statement on Monday.
Prosecutors in Serang, where the trial took place, rejected the accusation that they had sided with hard-liners. “Deden came specifically from Jakarta to prepare weapons, stones and spears. He was reminded by the police to stay away so there wouldn’t be a clash,” said Hamad Yunus, a member of the prosecution team.
“The citizens who came only wanted a dialogue, but there was resistance from the Ahmadis, which started the clash,” Mr. Yunus said.
The defense did not say whether it would appeal the verdict.

Sunday, September 4, 2011

Indonesian Police Used FPI as ‘Attack Dog,’ Leaked US Cable Alleges

http://www.thejakartaglobe.com/home/indonesian-police-used-fpi-as-attack-dog-leaked-us-cable-alleges/463174
Jakarta Globe | September 03, 2011


Unredacted US diplomatic cables published by antisecrecy Web site WikiLeaks on Friday allege collusion between Indonesian security forces and the radical Islamic Defenders Front.

Though the claims are not new, the leaked cables go into far greater detail than before and name the sources providing the US Embassy in Jakarta with information on a number of recent controversies, each of which has the potential to embarrass the Indonesian government.

One of the cables states that a contact within the State Intelligence Agency (BIN), Yahya Asagaf, had “sufficiently close contacts within” the Front, known as the FPI, to warn the embassy that it would be attacked by the vigilante group on Feb. 19, 2006, during protests against the publication of cartoons of the Prophet Mohammed.

The cable says the contact alleged that then National Police Chief Gen. Sutanto, the current head of BIN, had provided the FPI with funds prior to the attack, but cut off the funding after the incident.

“When we questioned [the contact’s] allegation that Sutanto funded FPI, Yahya said the police chief found it useful to have FPI available to him as an ‘attack dog,’” the cable says.
 
“When pressed further on the usefulness of FPI playing this role, noting that the police should be sufficiently capable of intimidation, Yahya characterized FPI as a tool that could spare the security forces from criticism for human rights violations, and he said funding FPI was a ‘tradition’ of the Police and BIN.”

The contact said the FPI had obtained the “majority of its funds from the security forces” but faced a “budget crunch” after the attack.

Another cable also alleges the FPI had close contacts with former Jakarta Police Chief Nugroho Djayusman, who admitted the connections to embassy officials.

“He then explained defensively that it was natural for him, as the Jakarta Police Chief, to have contacts with all sorts of organizations,” the cable continues. “This was necessary because the sudden release of energy from the Islamists, who had been repressed under [former dictator] Suharto, could have posed a security risk.

“‘But it doesn’t mean I was involved,’ he said, distancing himself from responsibility for any violent activities.”

The cable said that Nugroho illustrated his point by claiming that Sutanto lacked useful connections, “and when the violent FPI demonstration took place, Sutanto had to call Nugroho to request assistance.”

“Nugroho told us that he then called FPI Chairman Habib Rizieq and arranged the surrender of three men who had arranged the violence outside of the US Embassy. “

Nugroho, a controversial figure also blamed for failing to prevent the deadly anti-Chinese riots after the downfall of Suharto in 1998, also took a swipe at the FPI’s Islamic credentials.

Though he acknowledged the FPI had a “clear track record of violence” he labeled the group a “small, relatively insignificant group” that was “not ideological, except insofar as it opposed gambling, prostitution and pornography.”

“By contrast, he noted that ‘Ngruki’ (shorthand for [Abu Bakar] Bashir’s pesantren and, one can assume, the Jemaah Islamiyah organization) was a much more serious ideological group.”
 
In a later cable in the second quarter of 2006, Yenny Wahid, the daughter of former President Abdurrahman “Gus Dur” Wahid, said the retired group of security officers who had helped form and finance the FPI — including Nugroho — had lost control of the group, saying they had “‘created a monster’ that now functioned independently of its former sponsors and did not feel beholden to them.”

“Although anyone with money could hire FPI for political purposes, no one outside of the group could control FPI head Habib Rizieq, who functions as his own boss,” the cable said.

Tuesday, August 23, 2011

Indonesian mayor seeks to ban church construction

http://www.heraldtribune.com/article/20110823/API/1108230605
By MICHAEL HOLTZ
Associated Press

Published: Tuesday, August 23, 2011 at 4:31 a.m.



JAKARTA, Indonesia - A mayor is trying to ban Christian churches on streets with Islamic names, the latest attempt to block construction of a new parish in the world's largest Muslim-majority country.
Critics say the proposal - however arbitrary - is another example of growing religious intolerance.
The Taman Yasmin Indonesian Christian Church was supposed to open in the city of Bogor in 2008, but residents protested, claiming its permit was illegal.
Though the Supreme Court ruled in favor of the church in December, Mayor Diani Budiarto refused to comply.
He argued he was pushing for a decree to make it illegal to open churches on streets with Islamic names.
Indonesia, a secular nation of 240 million, has a long history of religious tolerance, but a small extremist fringe has become more vocal - and violent - in recent years.
Critics said President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono - who relies heavily on Islamic parties in parliament - has remained silent as minorities have been attacked by hard-liners or seen their houses of worship torched or boarded up.
Christians, who make up 10 percent of the population, also say it can take years to get permits to build new churches.
The Taman Yasmin worshippers have been holding weekly services in front of their sealed off building for nearly three years, said Bona Singalingging, the church spokesman.
He called the mayor's latest proposal part of a "dangerous" trend.
The Setara Institute for Peace and Democracy, a human rights group, says attacks on religious freedom by hard-liners more than tripled in the last two years.
In 2010, there were 64 incidents, ranging from physical abuse to preventing groups from performing prayers and burning houses of worship, up from 18 in 2009 and 17 in 2008.