Islamist politics in Indonesia, with its roots in twisted orthodoxy, is a perennial threat to the country. Equally alarming, it is a threat to the entire world.
AFP Photo/Bay Ismoyo
Arising tide of Islamism in its myriad forms – they run the gamut from premanberjubah (thugs draped in Arab garb) to social media activists, proselytism movements, educational networks, political parties and even terrorist groups affiliated with Al Qaeda and the Islamic State – has been among the most noteworthy phenomena to emerge in Indonesia during the past 20 years.
Individually and collectively, these developments threaten the unity of Indonesia and its people, often in ways more subtle and profound than the bloody conflicts waged in the name of Islam in regions as diverse as Ambon, Poso and Aceh. And yet, this threat is far from new. Both before and after Indonesia achieved independence, its founding fathers had to grapple with the tension that exists between Islamic orthodoxy and the ideals of the modern nation-state. In June 1945 the members of the Preparatory Committee for Indonesian Independence reached a temporary consensus with the Jakarta Charter, which subsequently formed the basis for the preamble to the Constitution of Indonesia. It originally included an obligation for Muslims to abide by Islamic law (Shariah).
In the course of further negotiation, secular Muslim nationalists, including Soekarno and Muhammad Hatta, persuaded their fellow committee members to delete seven words – “with Muslims required to observe Islamic law” – from the first principle of Pancasila, the state ideology. Hatta argued convincingly that Hindu- and Christian-dominated regions of the East Indies would refuse to join the Republic of Indonesia if its Constitution were to contain the seeds of an Islamic state.
Yet, although the committee members unanimously adopted the 1945 Constitution (UUD-45), the tension reflected in their debate over the Jakarta Charter has never been resolved and continues to roil Indonesian society to the present day. The election of a Constitutional Assembly in 1955 witnessed the re-emergence of this fierce debate regarding what form of government Indonesia should adopt: Islamic theocracy or a secular nationstate. After years of political maneuvering and conflict, in July 1959 President Soekarno wielded an iron fist to end the debate by dissolving the Constitutional Assembly and reimposing the 1945 Constitution via presidential decree.
In addition to paralyzing legislative conflict, the 1950s were also a time of armed rebellions waged in the name of Islam. Between 1949 and 1962, the Darul Islam/Tentara Islam Indonesia (Islamic State/Indonesian Islamic Army) movement flourished in the regions of West Java, South Sulawesi, South Kalimantan and Aceh. DI/TII, as it was known, recognized only Shariah as a valid source of law, while terrorizing and beheading its opponents. In Sumatra and Sulawesi, the Revolutionary Government of the Republic of Indonesia (PRRI) raised the banner of Islam, due to the fact that the Islamist party Masyumi – stung by its political defeat at the hands of President Soekarno, Kyai Wahab Hasbullah, the chairman of Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), and other Indonesian nationalists – was deeply involved in the CIA-backed PRRI/Permesta rebellion of 1958-1961.
These historical experiences demonstrate that Islamism, especially as a political movement based on religious identity, is indeed a latent, enduring threat to the existence of the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia (NKRI) as a multi-religious and pluralistic (Pancasila) nation-state.
Under the Soeharto regime, this threat was repressed continuously and with considerable difficulty, but never completely neutralized. The rising tide of Islamism in post-Soeharto Indonesia may thus be said to constitute a “rebound” of the perennial Islamist aspiration and its accompanying pressure to transform Indonesia from a Pancasila nation-state into an Islamic state.
Social groupings based on religious identity are a natural phenomenon of human civilization. The problem with certain tenets of Islamic orthodoxy lies in the fact that these invariably incarnate as a form of political identity, with a marked tendency to embrace absolutism and a hidden or explicit agenda of dominating the existing political order, whatever that may happen to be. Whether this struggle to acquire political supremacy is waged blatantly or covertly is simply a matter of strategy and tactics. Detailed analysis, including careful study of the historical dimensions of this phenomenon, may be necessary to gain a comprehensive understanding of this issue. Yet one thing cannot be denied: the aspiration for Islam to attain political domination is indeed an intrinsic part of orthodox Islamic teachings, if we employ the term “Islamic orthodoxy” to describe “an array of theological doctrines accepted by the majority of Muslims as the most authoritative religious reference standard.”
And how could this not be the case? Islamic orthodoxy includes a remarkably extensive discourse about public law, both civil and criminal, which is generally described as “God’s law” (Shariah) – or at least as “the interpretation of God’s law” – which must be implemented in daily life. Obviously, this cannot be achieved without political domination by those who wish to implement Shariah, which describes the Islamist agenda precisely.
Soeharto viewed Islamist political pressure as a threat to his own power. Hence, he adopted a strategy of political and military repression, combined with symbolic concessions carefully negotiated in order to pacify Islamist groups. The products of these negotiations are clearly visible in post-Soeharto Indonesia: the embedding of religious education within the school curriculum; the establishment of the Indonesian Ulema Council; the creation of an Islamic judicial system that exercises jurisdiction over marriage, divorce, remarriage and inheritance solely for Muslims; “political donations” offered to compliant Islamic institutions and organizations; the establishment of “Shariah-compliant” banks; and the creation and government support of the Association of Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals, to name a few.
And yet, like Muhammad Ali of Egypt, Ataturk of Turkey and the Pahlavis of Iran, the Soeharto regime failed to address the problematic tenets within Islamic orthodoxy that underlie and animate the perennial Islamist threat, which can only be done through a process of recontextualizing, or reforming, Islamic orthodoxy itself.
AFP Photo/Oka Budhi
Throughout its history, NU has been fortunate to possess leaders who strongly favored the Indonesian nation-state over theocracy and genuinely yearned for the well-being and political success of the NKRI. Among the most prominent of these NU leaders were Abdul Wahab Hasbullah and Abdurrahman “Gus Dur” Wahid. Both employed their religious authority as chairmen of the world’s largest Islamic organization to mobilize their followers and maneuver strategically in ways that proved crucial to the survival of the NKRI, Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution during truly desperate times.
During the 1950s and 1960s, Kyai Wahab blocked Masyumi from restoring the Jakarta Charter and transforming Indonesia into an Islamic state, supported Soekarno and the Indonesian military in repressing the Darul Islam and PRRI/Permesta rebellions, and allied with Soeharto to prevent a Communist seizure of power, such as that which had already occurred to such devastating effect in Russia, Eastern Europe, Central Asia, China, North Korea and Tibet. During the 1980s and 1990s, Gus Dur mobilized the NU to help ensure Indonesia’s successful transition from authoritarianism to democracy, and thus saved his nation from the fate that engulfed Syria, Yemen and Libya, and destroyed the fragile shoots of democracy in Egypt and Russia.
Kyai Wahab and Gus Dur encouraged other NU elites to develop a religious discourse that offered a concrete alternative to the obsolete, problematic tenets of Islamic orthodoxy. This alternative Islamic discourse has strengthened the legitimacy of the NKRI, Pancasila, the 1945 Constitution and Bhinneka Tunggal Ika – Indonesia’s national motto of Unity Amid Diversity – and mobilized the great mass of NU followers at the grassroots level to support this alternative discourse. But the “task” Kyai Wahab, Gus Dur and their followers have undertaken is far from complete. As Gus Dur himself remarked, “[We] must maintain a continuous dialogue between Islam and the Constitution.”
There is no license for political and military repression in Indonesia’s post-Soeharto reform era. The unchecked exercise of power is no longer feasible, for dynamic forces have emerged within civil society that constantly monitor government actions. As a result, the government cannot act arbitrarily to restrain Islamists’ political lust – even to defend the NKRI, Pancasila and the Constitution. As a natural consequence of these democratic and human rights developments, the “dialectical tension” between Islam and the NKRI is now largely governed – and political outcomes determined – by the complex interplay of competing forces within society at large.
Throughout the post-Soeharto era of democratic reform, the NU has adopted a resolute and unequivocal pro-NKRI/UUD- 45/Pancasila position in order to thwart efforts to transform Indonesia from a sovereign nation-state, whose Constitution and laws are derived from modern political processes, into a theocracy whose rulers share the perennial Islamist aspiration for the dominion of Islam and the establishment of a universal caliphate.
There can be little doubt that the outcome of this struggle, within Indonesia, will be impacted by the forces of globalization, which bring people and ideas from the far corners of the earth into daily contact with Indonesian Muslims, for both good and ill. So long as obsolete, medieval tenets within Islamic orthodoxy remain the dominant source of religious authority throughout the Muslim world, Indonesian Islamists will continue to draw power and sustenance from developments in the world at large. This is especially true so long as key state actors, including Iran, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Pakistan, continue to weaponize problematic tenets of Islamic orthodoxy in pursuit of their respective geopolitical agendas.
These considerations have led key figures within the NU, including Gus Dur in the months and years prior to his death in 2009, and former NU chairman A Mustofa Bisri, to conclude that it would be impossible to permanently resolve the tension that is inherent between Islamic orthodoxy and the NKRI/UUD-45, so long as we confine our efforts to the domestic, or purely Indonesian, context of the perennial Islamist threat.
Preserving Indonesia’s unique civilizational heritage, which gave birth to the NKRI as a multireligious and pluralistic nation-state, requires the successful implementation of a global strategy to develop a new Islamic orthodoxy that reflects the actual circumstances of the modern world in which Muslims must live and practice their faith.
This global effort, already launched by key elements of Nahdlatul Ulama, including its five-million-strong youth organization, Gerakan Pemuda Ansor, is not just an inevitable corollary of efforts to defeat Islamist subversion of Indonesia. It is vital to the wellbeing and preservation of virtually every other nation in the world whose laws are derived from modern political processes and whose people and governments do not wish to be subsumed in a universal Islamic caliphate or exhausted by the struggle to prevent its establishment.
The recontextualization and reform of Islamic orthodoxy is thus crucial to the welfare of Muslims and non-Muslims alike, for it constitutes the one indispensable prerequisite of any rational and humane solution to the multidimensional crisis that has plagued the Muslim world for more than a century and not only shows no sign of abating – despite an ever-growing toll of human lives and misery – but rather, increasingly threatens to spill over and engulf humanity as a whole.
Yahya Cholil Staquf is general secretary of the Supreme Council of Nahdlatul Ulama and director of religious affairs at Bayt ar-Rahmah li ad-Da‘wa al-Islamiyyah Rahmatan li al-‘Alamin in Winston-Salem, North Carolina.
Nahdlatul Ulama leader Yahya Cholil Staquf presents World Evangelical Alliance leader Thomas Schirrmacher with a festschrift at The Nation's Mosque in Washington, DC, during the 2021 International Religious Freedom Summit.
The world’s largest Muslim organization accepts that Christians will try to convert its members. A new partnership with evangelicals seeks to ensure this does not lead to conflict.
Last week, the World Evangelical Alliance (WEA) signed a statement of cooperation with Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), an Indonesian association that claims 90 million members worldwide. Established in 1926 to counter Wahhabi trends issuing from the Arabian Peninsula, its name means “Revival of the Religious Scholars.”
“Evangelicals very much aspire to proselytism, and so does Islam. So naturally there will be competition,” said NU secretary general Yahya Cholil Staquf. “But we need to have this competition conducted in a peaceful and harmonious environment.”
Staquf spoke from the stage of the 2021 International Religious Freedom (IRF) Summit in Washington. On its opening day, he and WEA secretary general Thomas Schirrmacher signed the Nation’s Mosque Statement, along with Talib Shareef, imam of Masjid Muhammad, the first American mosque built by the descendants of slaves.
Calling for “the emergence of a truly just and harmonious world order,” the statement seeks a global alliance “to prevent the political weaponization of identity” and “the spread of communal hatred.”
Schirrmacher called the WEA’s cooperation with NU the product of deep theological dialogue, counter to the academic tendency to downplay truth claims. And as evangelicals, evangelism is at the heart of their effort.
“We are working together for the right to convert each other,” the German theologian said. “Religious freedom does not mean that we agree but that we live in peace with our deep differences.”
But alongside evangelism is coexistence and common ground.
“There have been centuries of jihads and corresponding crusades,” said Thomas Johnson, senior advisor to the WEA’s Theological Commission. “It is time to set a conscious new direction.”
This includes recognition of “deep agreement” in terms of love of neighbor, human dignity, and helping the vulnerable. Johnson is also the WEA special envoy for engaging Humanitarian Islam, the title NU gives to its East Indies cultural manifestation of the faith.
Together with NU’s North Carolina–based institute, they released a festschrift in honor of Schirrmacher entitled God Needs No Defense: Reimagining Muslim-Christian Relations in the 21st Century.
The book prominently features a rebuke to Turkey’s President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan for converting Istanbul’s historic Hagia Sophia cathedral-museum into a mosque.
“That speaks a lot clearer than my voice as a follower of Jesus,” said Sam Brownback, co-chair of the IRF summit. During a plenary session, he held the book aloft, praising it as emblematic of the gathering’s interfaith cooperation.
“There are joyous engagements between Muslims, Sikhs, Christians, and Jews, meeting like old friends,” he told CT. “This is what I have dreamed of—deeper relationships at the leadership level, finding ways to stand up for each other’s religious freedom.”
The anthology’s title comes from Abdurrahman Wahid, Indonesia’s first democratically elected president and the former chairman of NU. A champion of religious dialogue, he and NU sought to model a conciliatory Islam in opposition to trends emerging from the Middle East.
About 87 percent of Indonesia’s population of 275 million follow Islam; roughly 10 percent are Christian. Hinduism and Buddhism comprise the remainder.
In 2019, a gathering of thousands of NU scholars abolished the religious category of kafir—“infidel,” or “non-Muslim”—replacing it with the concept of citizenship in a modern nation-state. The fatwa built upon their 2018 Nusantara Manifesto, criticizing the imposition of sharia law, and their 2016 Jakarta Declaration, decrying extremism and its alleged Islamic justifications.
“If necessary, traditional societies must make changes in their own values,” said Staquf from the IRF stage. “Abolishing the legal relevance of the category of ‘non-Muslim’ will enable us to coexist peacefully with others.”
Officially secular, Indonesia still maintains blasphemy laws. The US Commission on International Religious Freedom counted 39 cases of prosecution between 2014 and 2018.
“I appreciate that Humanitarian Islam’s efforts to recontextualize problematic tenets of Islam will take time and much discussion,” said Kyle Wisdom, WEA’s deputy coordinator in the NU working group. “I’m hopeful that this step will lead to a larger discussion within the Muslim world, but that remains to be seen.”
Even so, participants at the Nation’s Mosque Statement signing ceremony compared Indonesia and NU favorably against the Arab world.
“[NU documents] are consistent with Indonesian society, unlike other Muslim nations whose declarations do not match, even if they are correct,” said Shareef. “The ‘word became flesh’ in Nahdlatul Ulama.”
Schirrmacher said he was impressed to find in Indonesia that converts from Islam walk around freely. In signing this cooperative agreement, he said WEA leaders were eager for dialogue to “change something”—even if that is not necessarily the faith of their NU partners.
“We need to continue obeying our religion, but at the same time make peace with others,” said Staquf. “We hope the world will join us.”
To some, the persecution of a schoolteacher who showed his pupils a cartoon of the Prophet Mohammed may seem like a local quarrel. Does it really matter, many Britons will ask, that a few dozen men gathered at the gates of a school in West Yorkshire? Surely it will blow over before long, goes the thinking.
Alas, this view – all too common in officialdom throughout the western world – is deeply naïve. To those of us in the Muslim world who work to counter Islamist extremism, what is happening at Batley Grammar School is disturbingly familiar. What may look like a local incident is in fact one with national implications and strong international parallels. That is why it draws our attention.
Notably, it shares precisely the same ingredients as the row over Samuel Paty, the French teacher who showed his pupils similar images in a civic education class last autumn, and was then brutally murdered in the street. I only pray that what is happening in Batley does not end in violence.
These incidents illustrate an immense cultural and political gulf that exists in Western societies today. On one side stand proponents of a secular ideology whose cultural, economic and political power verges upon hegemony in much of the West. On the other side of this gulf stand those who embrace more traditional values, including many Christians, Orthodox Jews and Muslims.
Religious believers of all faiths often find their values and beliefs treated with derision and scorn, something that can be extremely offensive and upsetting. It is some Muslims’ misguided responses to this challenging and unfortunate reality, however, that so clearly set them apart from adherents of other faiths.
Rather than leading by example and seeking to raise the level of global discourse among the world’s diverse peoples, cultures and religions to that of the highest common denominator, some Muslims have allowed Islam to be hijacked by political opportunists. Instead of inspiring devotion and respect for the noble Prophet and his religion, the behaviour of Islamists and their habitual resort to intimidation and violence inspire revulsion, loathing and fear – in short, the very 'Islamophobia' they claim to oppose.
In my own country of Indonesia, where I am General Secretary of Nahdlatul Ulama, the world’s largest Muslim organisation, we have seen similar cases of Islamists attempting to dictate what can and can’t be discussed in the classroom – and even whether young Christian girls should have to wear headscarves. These disagreements, fuelled by extremist rhetoric and the echo chamber of social media, can escalate quickly. Islamists know very well how to spot and maximise such opportunities – which facts to ignore, and which to seize on.
It is not for me to advise directly what the UK government’s policy response should be. Whatever happens, the independent investigation into events in Batley must prove that it is truly independent and not surrender to implicit threats of violence in the name of social cohesion. Genuine social cohesion arises from mutual respect, which is earned through conduct that is worthy of respect from others. The tragic irony of the case in Batley is that, while local Muslims may believe that they are defending the Prophet, they have merely inspired antipathy and fear.
The truth is that this clash is only one small example of a much wider problem. It is directly linked to the fact that the Islamic world has not yet produced a full theological and socio-political framework that guides Muslims trying to live their lives faithfully and in harmony with the realities of modern life. France is perhaps the epicentre of this problem, as secularism is so much at the heart of the modern French state.
But Britain too will struggle to contain a problem that will only be solved when Muslims develop a theologically legitimate and authoritative framework, grounded within Islamic law, that enables them to dwell alongside those of different beliefs as equal citizens. Otherwise, European Muslims, including many in the UK, will continue to be drawn to groups that reject the authority of the state, leading to confrontations like the one outside Batley Grammar School and the intimidation of state employees.
This situation has been worsened, I would argue, by recent developments in Western political discourse. The re-emergence of identity politics has fostered a dynamic in which a kaleidoscopic array of groups insist that their grievances must be acknowledged, and their demands met, by society at large. Too often the official response to these grievances is to take them at face value. In the case of Islam, this has enabled political opportunists to weaponise Islamic identity and drag Muslim communities into the highly polarised and increasingly lethal 'culture wars' roiling much of the West.
The task therefore is to address this trend towards polarisation and identity-based conflict before it is too late. For present trends threaten to unravel the unique achievements of Western civilisation, which helped give birth to a rules-based international order founded upon respect for the equal rights and dignity of every human being. That should not be allowed to happen.
It is my view that part of the solution must come from within Islam itself. It is imperative that Muslims learn to adapt and live peacefully with others very different from themselves. Rather than allow extremists to turn Islam into modernity’s opposition, Muslims should engage in constructive dialogue that seeks to foster the shared civilisational values that may strengthen and enhance a rules-based international order dedicated to safeguarding national sovereignty and fundamental human rights.
Yahya Cholil Staquf is General Secretary of Nahdlatul Ulama, the world’s largest Muslim organisation. This article is part of Policy Exchange’s Understanding Islamism series – policyexchange.org.uk
SAATNYA TUMPAS SOFT & HARD TERORIS Di Poso dan Seluruh Indonesia
Ninoy Karundeng
Jokowi diharapkan tidak terlarut dan ngeributin soal Palestina doang. Sementara empat orang WNI dibantai di Indonesia. Sampai saat ini pemerintah belum membuat pernyataan, terkait pembantaian di Poso yang dilakukan oleh Mujahidin Indonesia Timur (MIT). Jokowi pun belum mengecam keras. *KSP bersumpah aparat akan mengejar teroris MIT.*
*Peristiwa pembantaian oleh teroris Sigi 2020 kembali terulang. Lokasinya pun sama. Poso. Empat orang petani dibantai. Bukan kebetulan mereka adalah jemaat gereja Toraja dan umat Katolik. Pelakunya pun sama. Teroris terkait dengan ISIS. Kali ini yang bermain adalah teroris Mujahidin Indonesia Timur.*
*Hutan Poso adalah rumah paling ideal bagi teroris. Gerombolan teroris FPI pun memiliki home base di Poso.* Teroris FPI mendirikan sekolah di tengah hutan yang ajarannya adalah memersiapkan anak-anak untuk menjadi teroris. Sebuah video beredar adanya Desa Pembinaan Mualaf milik organisasi teroris FPI.
Di sana FPI menyediakan sarana pendidikan dan pengajar di desa Mualaf Hidayah Sadame. Kampung di tengah hutan belantara pegunungan Tojo, Kabupaten Tojo Una-Una. Lokasi ini hanya bias ditempuh dengan berjalan kaki selama 8-10 jam perjalanan.
Teroris FPI mencetak kaum radikal dan teroris di tempat tersembunyi ini. Pentolan organisasi teroris FPI Sulawesi Tengah Sugianto Kaimudin yang merintis pendidikan yang dilakukan oleh teroris FPI di tempat ini.
Buat apa membuat tempat pengajaran yang isinya cuma belajar agama. Di dinding tempat belajar tidak tampak foto Presiden Jokowi dan Ma’ruf Amin. Yang ada justru symbol-simbol tokoh kaum radikal. Pengajarnya pun mengenakan seragam teroris FPI.
Artinya, bahwa kaum radikal, teroris menggunakan FPI sebagai rumah bersama mereka. Untuk itu aparat keamanan, BIN, Densus 88, akan menindaklanjuti temuan ini. Organisasi teroris yang membangun kekuatan di hutan-hutan Sulawesi Tengah, seperti Poso, Tejo dan sekitarnya, menjadi ancaman serius bagi keamanan warga.
Tak mengherankan sejak 2015 pembantaian terhadap warga minoritas di Poso, Sulteng, terus berulang di 2020 di Poso. Kini terjadi lagi di sana. Sangat menyedihkan aksi teroris terus berulang.
*MIT jelas merupakan bagian dari ISIS. Organisasi teroris FPI , dengan dihadiri oleh teroris ISIS-FPI Munarman, telah membaiat ratusan orang di Makassar. Sebagian besar yang dibaiat di Makassar berasal dari Poso, Makassar, dan wilayah Sulawesi. Mereka kini menyebar ke mana-mana. Termasuk tentu Poso.*
Mereka inilah yang wajib diwaspadai selain para anggota teroris Jamaah Ansharut Daulah (JAD), Jamaah Ansharut Tauhid (JAT) dan juga teroris FPI. Yang paling parah dan membahayakan adalah organisasi teroris FPI adalah rumah bagi semua kelompok teroris dari mulai JAD, JAT, MIT, ISIS.
Setahun lalu, setelah peristiwa Sigi, publik sangat berharap Presiden Jokowi bertindak tegas. Jokowi tidak boleh mengikuti gendering yang ditabuh oleh kaum kadal gurun alias kadrun. Kadrun seperti orang MUI mengencam teroris yang membantai 4 orang di Poso. Namun, saat bersamaan MUI menyentil Israel. Tidak fokus. Ragu dalam mengecam terorisme yang membantai jemaat gereja.
Kesedihan keluarga, jemaat, rakyat minoritas di Poso, di Tana Toraja, tak terperikan. Rasa takut, khawatir, was-was dan ngeri tentu meliputi hati yang menjadi kecut. Suasana kesedihan tak terperikan mengetahui kenyataan mereka digorok, disiksa, dan dipenggal kepala mereka. Kekejaman yang tak terperi. Hanya karena mereka berbeda keyakinan dengan para teroris MIT.
Sedangkan Presiden Jokowi bertindak tegas soal teroris KKB di Papua. Tak kurang Menkopolhukam membuat pernyataan keras. Terkait pembunuhan di Poso, Presiden Jokowi selayaknya mengeluarkan pernyataan dan kecaman terhadap teroris MIT.
